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FOUR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO RESTORE 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EQUILIBRIUM 

Stimulated by Fleming's study on a related subject, the author com- 
pares four methods to eliminate balance of payments disequilibria be- 
tween high-employment countries forming a closed group: (i) "discrim- 
inatory" import duties and subsidies, (ii) "discriminatory" duties only 
or the corresponding quantitative restrictions, (iii) nondiscriminatory 
duties, and (iv) devaluation or income adaptation. For each an "opti- 
mum version" is defined and chosen; they are compared as to (a) the loss 
in international trade and (b) the distribution of the "direct burden" 
between the countries (defined as the short-run loss in real expenditure). 
A number of rather specific simplifications are introduced, all tending 
to make the case as symmetric as possible with regard to countries and 
commodities. As a consequence of the high-employment hypothesis and of 
absence of production substitution, problems of optimum allocation of 
resources are ruled out; the approach is a short-run one. Only policies 
(i) and (iv) show no loss of trade, whereas the others do; but in the case 
of devaluation the "direct burden" is relatively heavier for the deficit 
countries than in the other three cases. 
1. SETTING OF THE PROBLEM, ASSUMPTIONS MADE, AND 
PRACTICAL BACKGROUND 
IN THIS paper I propose to compare-under assumptions to be speci- 
fied and defended-four alternative policies to restore balance of pay- 
ments equilibria. Let a group of m countries be given (forming together 
a closed group) with initial balance of payments deficits D' (i = 1, .. . , 
m) where 
(1.1) CD i = o  
i 
and hence some countries have negative Di, i.e., a surplus. As a rule i t  
will be assumed that D1< D2 < . . < Dm.I t  will be assumed that in 
all four cases a policy of high employment will be pursued by all coun- 
tries concerned, meaning that the total volume of production in each 
country is kept constant. 
The policies to be considered are the following: I. Discriminatory 
import duties and subsidies. By this phrase I mean that each country 
imposes a tariff on its imports that is differentiated as to countries of 
origin ("discriminatory"). (When using the word discriminatory in the 
usual political sense we should not forget that i t  is doubtful whether 
the distinction between discrimination and nondiscrimination makes 
sense.) I t  is further assumed that the tariffs are so chosen as to maxi- 
mise general welfare W of the group of countries (to be defined) under 
the side conditions that the balances of payments should be in equilih- 
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rium. As far as the optimum tariffs thus defined would turn out to be 
negative, it would mean that certain imports should be subsidized 
rather than taxed. This technique, which with other objectives, is actu- 
ally applied in a number of countries, is therefore not excluded in this 
first policy considered, although the author very much doubts its prac- 
tical possibility with the targets set here. I t  appears, however, that this 
case is an attractive theoretical case, useful for the understanding of 
the other, more practical policies. 
11. Discriminatory (positive) duties or import restrictions. Here the 
same policy as under ( I )  is considered, but negative duties are ex-
cluded. Positive duties will restrict the volume of imports and the effect 
will, if the expenditure of the duties collected will satisfy a certain 
condition, be equivalent to a system of quotas that may be measured 
by the duties they replace. 
111. Nondiscriminatory import duties. Here it is assumed that again 
only positive duties are imposed, but that no difference is made accord- 
ing to the origin of the imports. Still the objective is to eliminate the 
balance of payments deficits under the maximum level of welfare. 
IV. Devaluation or income adaptation. This fourth policy consists of a 
general price decrease applied by each of the exporting countries to the 
extent made necessary by the targets indicated before. 
The assumptions made are rather specific; therefore the paper only 
has a modest bearing. I t  is not intended as a basis for statistical testing 
but rather for teaching in that it tries-for reasons of simplification- 
t,o eliminate complications that, although important in practical prob- 
lems, are not directly connected with the core of the questions a t  dis- 
cussion. The main assumptions are: ( 1 )  a policy of high employment is 
pursued in all countries concerned, implying that production is not 
varied and that the problem of optimum allocation of resources is dis- 
regarded; (2) production does not use imported raw materials (or raw 
material suppliers are part of each country); from ( 1 )  and (2) it follows 
that there is no reason to expect changes in production cost and that 
the problems considered are mainly problems of distribution; (3) cer-
tain symmetry properties of the model are assumed that are not imme- 
diately connected with the problems at  issue and that largely simplify 
the algebra; (4) the directive for finding, in each case of policy, the 
"best representative" of that case has been a welfare concept that is- 
as any such concept, subjective-and that in particular implies some 
degree of equality in satisfaction level between the countries studied. 
These assumptions will be discussed in more detail a t  the places where 
they are introduced. 
The practical background of the comparative study of these four 
policies may be seen in the desire to judge the methods that have, in 
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the postwar years in particular, been used or advocated in order to 
equilibrate the balances of payments. The next objective is to derive 
devices for future use, in part for integration problems, although these 
problems are of a somewhat different structure. The immediate induce- 
ment to this study was the stimulating paper by Ail. ~ l em i n ~ . 'Fleming 
follows a different method, in some aspects more general, in others less 
general; and the present paper may be considered in part as a comment 
on these latter aspects. 
2. MODELS AND SYMBOLS USED 
As the main instrument of our analysis a macromodel of a simple 
structure will be used in which it is assumed that each country produces 
one good which it supplies to all other countries and to its own home 
market. For country i the quantity supplied to country j will be indi- 
cated by xi', where the order of the indices indicates the direction of the 
- . 
movement of the commodities. All symbols (except those with a bar) 
indicate changes with respect to the initial situation; since a high-
employment policy was assumed to be in operation before and after 
the adjustment, the sum total of all xi', representing production in 
country i, does not change: 
In  this sum, x" represents the quantity of i's produce retained for home 
consumption and investment; it equals 
where the inequality j # i indicates that the summation should be ex- 
tended over all values of j except i. Because of the high-employment 
policy exactly this quantity will be sold a t  the home market. 
The demand for xi' will depend, we assume, on all prices prevailing 
in country j, and on income y': 
Some characteristics of this assumption are: (a) it is a linear func- 
tion of real income yj and of prices; (b) it is such that a uniform price 
rise does not affect demand (negative and positive terms then cancel); 
and (c) it is as symmetric in the various prices as possible. 
Without further assumptions as to f eij does not represent an elas- 
ticity. 
1 M. Fleming, "On Making the Best of Balance of Payments Restrictions on 
Imports," Economic Journal, Vol. 61, 1951, p. 48. 
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Since high-employment policy may, as a first approximation, also 
be translated by y' = 0, the first term does not play any role in our 
problems. For the same reasons it is assumed that the only causes for 
changes in price mill be found in the direct effects of import duties, sub- 
sidies, or devaluation (income adaptation). This hypothesis implies, 
however, that no raw materials are imported from the other countries; 
or a t  least that their prices are not affected by the policies considered. 
One might, in the latter case, think of raw materials being freely im- 
ported everywhere in the case of policies (I), (11), and (111), or of coun- 
tries already integrated with their raw material suppliers. 
The initial values of all prices are supposed to be one, which is a ques- 
tion of a choice of units. Further, certain properties of symmetry, not 
being of immediate significance for the problems but very much sim- 
plifying certain relations, will be assumed to exist. I t  will be assumed 
that the initial values of the trade between any two countries are almost 
equal and that the elasticities of demand are also almost equal making 
all ei' = e. The first of these two assumptions implies that the coun- 
tries are, from the economic point of view, of almost equal size. Any 
application to real problems would require a certain grouping of the 
countries into groups of almost equal size. Complete equality of trade 
is incompatible, however, with the existence of initial balance of pay- 
ments deficits and our exact choice of initial values must be in accord- 
ance with those deficits. Such an exact choice will only be made for a 
special case to be discussed later. 
For certain purposes, a micromodel will be used that is more general 
in that it assumes n goods to be bought by each country from every 
other country, but less general as to the form of the demand functions. 
I t  is assumed that the demand for any good in any country (other than 
its own goods) depends on the price only of the good considered. 
Sometimes it seems worth while to make calculations for the case of 
three countries only if those for m countries turn out to be very compli- 
cated. There is some sense in using this case, the simplest where the 
exports of one country are not always equal to the imports of another, 
as in the two-country model. In  particular the nearly symmetry hypoth-
eses have been worked out in more detail for the case of three countries. 
Since D1< DZ < D3 and Di = 0, D1will always be negative and 
D3 positive. Hence, the initial values of the x will have to satisfy the 
conditions: 
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Since f 1 3  appears twice on the greater side, f 1 2  once on the greater side 
and once in the more neutral relation (2.4), fZ3and f32once on both 
sides, fZ1and f3'only on the smaller side and 2" once also in the relation 
(2.4), it makes sense to assume that f 1 3  > 2'' > fZ3= f3'> fZ1> 8, 
although this certainly is not necessary. In order to have a simple ex- 
ample with probable values it is therefore assumed that 
in which case we find: 
For a fair comparison between the four policies we will take, as a 
representative for each type of policy, an optimum version of each. This 
optimum version is the one where the instruments have such numerical 
values as to maximise welfare. To this end we want a definition of wel- 
fare W.It is only too well-known that such a definition must always con- 
tain an element of arbitrary choice, but it is equally obvious that prac- 
tical policy cannot wait until this problem has been solved. The choice 
made here, following Fleming, is that total welfare W may be considered 
as the sum of welfare figures or the individual countries and that 
wi = x2i, . . . , xmi), whereas? ~ i ( ~ l i  
aw' 
-= pi'.
asii 
3. CRITERIA USED FOR COMPARISON 
The comparison to be made between the effects of the policies defined 
above will be based on three criteria. The first is the loss E of international 
trade they cause, compared with the initial situation; i.e., the decrease 
in total turnover of international trade, valued at  initial prices. This in 
fact seems to be a correct (inverse) measure of total satisfaction, given 
the fact that in all situations considered production remains the same 
and that hence a loss of international trade only means that certain 
2 Choosing the sum of the national welfare functions each obeying (2.8) as the 
general welfare function evidently would be hardly justifiable if the standard of 
life of the countries considered diverges considerably. As long as there is no cor- 
relation between this standard of life and the deficit D%ur choice may be seen 
as a further symmetry assumption only. That pi<  has been chosen as a measure 
for the social utility of good x i  to country i may be motivated by pointing out that 
the consumption of that good is restricted to the level where the marginal buyer 
pays t,hat price for it .  
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goods are consumed el~ewhere.~ Of course i t  has to be admitted that  the 
initial situation of free trade was a state of disequilibrium and that hence 
in the long run its prices will have to change. But it so happens that the 
effect of policy (IV), which maintains free trade, shows no loss of inter- 
national trade and that therefore our criterion also measures the loss 
of international trade in comparison to that case, which is in long-term 
equilibrium. 
The second criterion to be used is the distribution of the burden be- 
tween the countries. By this concept we mean nothing but the set of 
figures indicative of total consumption of (and investment in) goods in 
each country, disregarding the fact of changing foreign assets. The 
concept may be said to represent the direct burden on each country- 
i.e., the decrease in the volume of goods a t  their disposal during a time 
unit-and only to be a correct criterion for short-run views. 
The third criterion we shall use is the stability condition that distin- 
guishes devaluation from the other policies. For each policy, a stable 
new equilibrium will only be attained if the elasticities of demand fulfill 
certain requirements. Policies for which this condition is more stringent 
have less chance of being applicable, which is in itself a disadvantage. 
This may also be formulated by saying that such policies tend to make 
heavier disturbances necessary in the internal economy of the country 
considered. 
4. DISCRIMINATORY IMPORT DUTIES AND SUBSIDIES 
As announced already in Section 2, we will present our main argu- 
ment with the help of our rnac~omodel. 
Let a positive or negative duty be levied of t" in country j on products 
from country i, bringing prices to the level 1 + ti'. The demand for 
product i in count,ry j will then become: 
Alssuming that these duties and subsidies be levied in such a way as 
to maximize welfare with the side conditions that equilibrium in the 
3 I t  might be asked why welfare was not taken as the criterion. This was in  fact 
tried; i t  turned out to  be a very complicated job to calculate the welfare change 
and as a first approximation i t  was equal in all four cases. "Loss in international 
trade" in a sense appears to  be a more sensitive measure. I n  its turn it  is, however, 
less appropriate as a basis for the "optimum version" of each policy, since it  is a 
linear function of the t's. 
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balances of payments be restored, we may calculate their level with the 
help of the well-known Lagrange multipliers X from the equations: 
aw a~~
s F + ~ b - 7 = 0  ( i , j = 1, . . - ,m ) ,
at4 
(4 .4)  D' = -Di ( i  = 1, - . ,m).+ 
Now we assumed (Section 2) that W = JVV i  = 1, . . . ,m), where 
TV' only depends on xh"h = 1, . . ,m), i.e., the x consumed in countrjr 
i .  Further, t" directly influences only the demand for all imports into 
j, xh' ( h  = 1, . . . ,m but h Z j )  and, via xhj, through (4 .2) ,  xhh, except 
2" which only depends on the import duties in the other countries. 
Hence 
€ for h #  i 
' \-. for h = i 
axhh- -E
- - -- for h # i ,  j 
atij m - 1 
Therefore 
The balance-of-payments deficit, 
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The import duty t" only influences the demand for xhi (h# j ) ;hence we 
have : 
where this equals 
(4.14) E if k # i, and E if k = i,
m - 1  
Equations (4.3) therefore become: 
which may be written 
( i , j  = 1, , m ; i  f j) 
These equations, m2-m in number, each of them containing only the 
t h j  with the same j ,  i.e. for one country, may be divided into m groups, 
each for one j. Each group t,hen contains m - 1 independent equations 
for the m - I unknowns, and their solution can easily be seen to be: 
(4.17) t t j  = l i- A .3 .  
The values of Xi  have to be found from equations (4.4) which may 
be given the form 
Using only complete sums and deducting the appropriate items where 
incomplete sums are required, we get 
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D"
m
-C ti' --~ ~ t h j = - -
m - 1  j m - l h  j E 
We could, if we wished, replace the t's by the expressions (4.17); we 
would then have m equations in the X's, which add up to the identity 
0 = 0, meaning that one X may be chosen arbitrarily. In  fact, only the 
differences interest us. For certain purposes, however, i t  is even better 
to adhere to equations (4.20) in the t's. 
As we have set out in Section 3, we are particularly interested in the 
loss L in international trade caused by this policy and in the changes 
in consumption of the individual countries. 
L may be composed by adding the losses L~ for each country i 
in imports, where 
which, according to (4.19), after division by e equals 
Hence 
There appears to be no loss in international trade. 
The change ~ " n  consumption calculated according to our device 
(Section 3) equals 
i.e., the change in consumption is equal to the initial balance-of-payments 
surplus, a statement which is valid for all cases where import and 
export prices are not changed. 
After having presented our argument with the help of the macro- 
model, we may add a few considerations based on the micromodel. As 
the reader will remember, the assumption was made for this model 
that more than one product is supplied from each country j to any other 
country i, these products being numbered with a lower index k but that 
the demand for good k only depends on its own price. Since again in- 
comes are supposed to be constant we now have 
Welfare W' now depends on mn quantities z,? and a ~ ' / a x : ~  1 + t,?= 
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whereas axh'/atii = -ef. Hence 
awi (4.23) --- - -(1 + t?) e:".ate
Apart from exerting a direct influence only on xc, tj' indirect'ly influ- 
ences 22 because zp = -xi,j xji, by virtue of which we have 
It follows that 
aw awi awj
-- --., + 7= -pi ii 
ate at;' at;' k ek  . 
For Di we have 
from which we deduce dD'/atli = - ti,",a ~ ' / a t i ~= eai, and a ~ ~ / a t i '  = 
0, (h # i, j). The optimum values of t,he fiiare therefore given by the 
equations 
or 
(4.28) ti ' = X i  - X i .  
We therefore find, in this case, essentially the same result as in (4.17), 
and in addition that t i y s  independent of k. The import duties must be 
equal for all goods supplied by country j to couritry i. This result is a t  
variance with Fleming's device that the duties should be proportional 
to what he calls the responsiveness R = a(px)/ax. Fleming's result is 
however somewhat more general; ours is only valid wit,h perfect com- 
petition. The main conclusion that the duties have to depend on the 
order of strength of the countries is common to all approaches, however. 
We now assume that boundary conditions be imposed to the effect 
that only positive values of ti' are accepted, which may either be inter- 
preted literally as positive duties (excluding subsidies) or as represent- 
ing import restrictions the extent of which is measured by the duties 
that mould be necessary in order to attain the same effect.' This comes 
This involves certain hypotheses as t o  the way in which the proceeds of these 
duties are spent, which we need not specify here. 
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to (i) leaving out of our system of maximum conditions (4.16) s certain 
number of these equations, say, those for ti''', where the values of i' 
and j' are as yet unknown and (ii) putting equal to zero these same 
ti'". From the remaining equations the other ti' can be determined; 
they have to fulfill the condition that they are all positive. It appears 
that this condition can be satisfied in different ways, depending on the 
data of the problem. As a Jirst case, we shall treat Fleming's solution. 
In this case6 11-e are able to place the countries in an order of decreasing 
X's: X1 >, Xz >/ X3 . . . >/ Am  and then put equal to zero all t's with j' < i', 
i.e., vi th falling indices. There remain the t's with rising indices. The 
symmetry of the equations is somen-hat disturbed and the new system 
may be described as fo l lo~~s .  
No change occurs in the group of equations relating to the import 
duties of the last country m, since these duties all have rising indices. 
Hence these ti" remain equal to A' - Am, which are always positive. 
For any country n < m, the t i n  with i >, n vanish and the group of 
equations is 
p-
- --I - -- (tin - X I  + x n )  + ( t zn  - AS + ~ n ). aa 
m - 1  
where 
1A = + --- ( -An+,  + An) + aI ( - A ~ + z  + ~ n )
nz - 1 . . a  
that is, to say, the terms in which the t's are equal to zero. The solution 
I am indebted to Messrs. J. Hartog and L. M. Koyck for a stimulating dis- 
cussion out of which the following reaults emerged. They are not, however, re- 
sponsible for any mistakes that still might be involved. 
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is easily found; writing s" for tin - X; + A, , a for l/(m - I) ,  we have 
sln - - asBn . . .  - aSn-l,n = A 
from which it is clear that s'" = sZn= . . . sn-l, = A/[l  - a(n - I)]. 
Elimination of the auxiliary symbols yields: 
m 
(m - n)A, - C ~h 
n+1(5.2) ti" - X i  - A n  + 
m - n + l  ' (i < n). 
These expressions are always positive since X i  > X, and X, > Ah, 
There remains the problem to find the X's; these are functions of the 
given initial deficits Di which we have to determine by substituting 
equations (5.2) into the demand equations (4.1) and the latter into 
(4.12). We shall only illustrate the procedure for the case of three coun-
tries. 
For m = 3 we find that now of the six import duties ti' only t12, t13, 
and tZ3remain different from zero. The duties in country 3 remain as 
before : 
(5.3) t13 = A1 - X3, tZ3= A2 - XS , 
whereas the one for country 2 becomes 
The balance-of-payments deficits are, in the case where e = 2: 
~l = 2t12 + 2t13 - tz3 = - i j 1  
(5.5) 0 2  = -t 12 - t13 + 2~23= - i)2 
12 13D~= -t - t - tZ3= - D3. 
Combining (5.3)' (5.4), and (5.5) we find 
and 
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We cannot find the absolute values of the X's, since the equations 
(5.5) and (5.6) add up to an identity 0 = 0 and are therefore dependent; 
but we only need the differences between the X's. If we like, we may 
transform (5.7) and (5.8) into expressions with B1and without one of 
the other D's, since D1$- D2+ D3 = 0. From (5.7) i t  is clear that the 
order of countries 2 and 3 is unambiguous; always X2 > X3, since D3 > 
D2.The order of 1and 2, however, need not coincide with the order of 
their D's; i t  may be that XI < Xz , since the sign of 0' may be negative. 
Here we are confronted with the fact that Fleming's solution is not 
always possible. If 
5 D 2 + D 3  < 0 
we are not able to put the countries in the order assumed; neither are 
we able to do so by interchanging countries 1 and 2. 
This brings us back to the general problem where the number of coun- 
tries need not be three. It would be somewhat lengthy to give a com- 
plete discussion. The following remarks may, however, be an indication 
of the situation. Dependent on the data it will be possible either to have 
only a smaller number of positive t's than in the Fleming solution or, 
sometimes, to have a larger number. There are, however, certain limits. 
On the one hand, i t  is always possible to have m - 1 positive t's, one 
of the possibilities being the one of the nondiscriminatory duties (cf. 
Section 6). On the other hand, i t  follows from the previous case (cf. 
Section 4) that not all the t's can be positive. More specifically, since 
the equations for the t's can be grouped according to the tariff-imposing 
countries, and the group of t's relating to one imposing country depends 
on the X's in a way independent from the way in which the t's in any 
other imposing countries do, i t  follows that a t  least one of the t's in 
countries other than the weakest has to be taken equal to 0.Otherwise, 
the t's of such a country would be determined by the equations (4.17) 
and a number of them (where i > j) would be negative. There may be 
situations, i t  seems, where one t taken equal to zero would suffice. I t  may 
be easily shown that if for each country i only the duty with respect to 
the weakest country, viz., tmi be taken equal to zero, the other duties 
become : 
tJ' = Xi - A , .  
This is always positive again if we succeed in finding a set of Xh's falling 
in value while h increases. The conditions to be fulfilled by the Dh in 
order that this applies will presumably be stricter than in Fleming's 
case. For the three-country model it can easily be shown that they some- 
times can be met. 
If, for countries i (i f m, m - I), both t" and ti'"-' are assumed to 
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be zero, one finds, for the other t's 
which will always be possibly positive, provided that the Ah'smeet the 
condition of falling with rising h's. It seems probable that this condition 
may be shown to be less stringent than in the previous case, etc. Thus 
depending on the set of Dh, there may be found a different number of 
t's that can be chosen positive, with a minimum of m - 1 and a maxi- 
mum of me - 2m + 1. 
Having discussed the problem of the optimum values of (positive) 
import duties we have now to enquire what the consequences are for 
the loss L in international trade and the changes in weljare. From (4.21) 
me see that, in our first case 
( j  < i). 
Since all t's are now positive, there is, with this type of policy, always a 
loss in international trade. 
As an illustration, we calculate the loss for the three-country case. 
From (5.3)' (5.4)' (5.7), and (5.8) we find 
For the special case this amounts to 
-41~0 in the cases where Fleming's solution does not apply, formula 
(4.21) shows that there will always be a loss in international trade. 
The distribution of the burden between the various countries, repre- 
sented by the values of c', the change in consumption, is the same here 
as in the previous case for the reasons given in Section 4. 
Finally, a few remarks may again be added on the solution of our 
present problem for the micromodel. Because of the simplifying hypothe- 
sis made for this model, that demand only depends on the price of the 
article considered, the solution is simpler here than in the macromodel. 
This will a t  once be clear from equations (4.27), where each t{<s 
determined independently from all the others. In  our present problem 
this means, that although a number of the t's are to be zero, this does 
not influence the equations for the other t's. Equation (4.28) therefore 
remains valid for all positive t's and i t  says that if we are again able to 
put the countries in the order of rising X's all t's with rising indices will 
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be admissible. Of course, the numerical values of the X's are now dif- 
ferent from those in the case of positive and negative t's. They have to 
be found from the side conditions which i t  is not difficult to express 
as functions of A'. This may be left to  the reader. 
By nondiscriminatory import duties we shall understand duties r" 
which are the same for imports of different provenance into the same 
country. We add the condition that a t  least one country shall impose no 
duties a t  all. This means that only m - 1unknowns r' (i = 2, . . . ,m) 
are now introduced and that prices = ri for any j. Since the number 
of side conditions is also equal to m - 1, these conditions will deter- 
mine the r's without allowing any room for making W a maximum. 
They will run as follows: 
where the sums inside the brackets are to be extended over nz - 2 
competing import goods and hence are equal to (m - 2) eri/(m - 1)  
and (m - 2)~rj/(m - 1) respectively. Hence 
As a cross check we find that the sum total of these m equations yields 
the identity 0 = 0. From r' = 0 i t  follows that  
and therefore 
The duties appear to be proportional to the difference of the deficit 
of the country concerned with the deficit of country 1, the strongest 
country. 
The loss L of international trade now amounts to 
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For our special three-country model this amounts to +126, which is 
considerably more than with discriminatory import duties, where L = 
46. Generally speaking the loss amounts, in the three-country case, to 
-2 IS' as against -D1 - D2 with discriminatory duties. Since D2 
> Dl, it follows that 
the loss is less if discrimination is applied. 
The distribution of the burden between the countries is the same as in 
Section 4. 
7 .  DEVALUATION 
In this case, no import duties are levied, but export prices are de- 
creased by ti by country i. The important difference between this and 
the previous cases is that the prices in the balances of payments are now 
no longer equal to one, but to 1 - ti. 
Also in the case of devaluation there are only m - 1 unknowns, via., 
the price decreases t' effectuated by country i, where t1 will be taken equal 
to zero beforehand. Hence here again only the side conditions determine 
the solution. They are 
where 
Elaboration of these formulae yields 
- €ti - C t + t i  + (m- l ) t i  = -Di. 
This may be written 
(7.3) (em- m + 1) (Ct - mt') = - (m - 1) ISi 
Taking i = I ,  nrecan express C t as a function of D' and substitute this 
in all the other equations, which gives us 
As in (6.3)we here find that the degree of devaluation required for coun- 
try i is proportional to the difference in deficit between country i and 
country 1. In  order, however, that a stable solution be obtained, i.e., a 
positive value for t" the elasticity has to obey the condition 
This condition corresponds to the well-known statement that the elas- 
ticity has to surpass some critical value, that depends on the details of 
the model. It represents a drawback for devaluation as an instrument of 
restoring equilibrium. 
Tile loss L i n  international trade may be calculated from the first sum 
in (7.1) which has to be summed for all countries. According to the 
elaboration this equals the expression 
for country i and hence, in t,otal amounts to 
There is no loss of international trade. 
The distribution of the burden according to our previously given defi- 
nition may be calculated in the following way: 
which, with (7.3), becomes 
Since the value of the denominator is, for acceptable E'S, smaller than 
that of the numerator, the distribution of the burden is more uneven 
than in the other cases. The strongest country wins more and the weak- 
est loses more. 
- - 
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We may summarise our findings in the following table: 
EFFECT OF FOUR ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO RESTORE BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS EQUILIBRIUM 
Diacriminatary,Import duties (or Te8tnct10118) Nondiscriminatory
Policy 1 Import dutim Devaluation or Income Adaptation t r i c t i o )
ody 

sidies 
 1 I 
Loas of inter- 
national 
trade.. . . . .  (three coun- 
triee) ...... 
(three coun- 
tries spec- 
ial cLe) ... 
Burden on 
-, 
country i..D' Tii 
Extent of 
measures.. 
Stability
condition.. c > 0 e > 0 
a This has not been calculated explicitly. 

This ia true in Fleming's case. 

From this table it appears that devaluation has, in comparison to the 
two practically possible systems of restriction I1 and 111, the important 
advantage of a zero loss in international trade, meaning that the optimum 
use of resources will be better approached than with import duties or 
restrictions. I t  has the t xo  disadvantages of putting a heavier burden 
on the consumption (cf. Section 3) of the weaker countries and of being 
bound to the condition that elasticities of demand should be large 
enough. 
Of the two systems of restriction, it is clear that discriminatory re- 
striction reduces the loss of international trade, as has been pointed out in 
particular by Frisch. 
Method I ,  where also subsidies are applied and the symmetry is there- 
fore maintained, is perhaps only of a theoretical interest, since, as has 
been said already. the application of subsidies by the strong countries 
in order to help the weak ones would not seem probable. I t  is theoreti- 
cally interesting, however, since it represents a sort of a bridge between 
the other policies. It, has in common with devaluation that there is no 
loss of international trade, and it has even the advantages over devalu- 
ation that the burden is distributed more evenly and that there is no 
difficulty with low elasticities. 
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These conclusions may be placed against a somewhat more general 
background which, however, necessarily must also be more speculative. 
A first remark may be made referring to the choice between devaluation, 
which implies the maintenance or even introduction of free trade, and 
the policies of restriction. The advantage of free trade (and hence 
devaluation or income adaptation in order to restore balance of pay- 
ments) is evident, particularly so for long-term policies, since it implies 
the optimum use of resources. The disadvantage of being bound to 
higher elasticities also counts less in the long run since long-term elas- 
ticities are, generally speaking, higher than short-term. Restrictive 
policies on the other hand may be considered to be appropriate for the 
cure of temporary and large disequilibria as caused by catastrophes. 
,4 second remark may be added referring to the choice between de- 
tailed and general policies. Cases I and I1 once more illustrate that de- 
tailed policies (i.e. policies with a large number of instruments) some- 
times are superfluous. In fact, the result that t" = XXi- Xi  is, invarious 
cases, considered the optimum solution, after all means that we do not 
use the many degrees of freedom we have at  our disposal. We reduce 
the m2 - m values of the t's to only m - 1values of the differences be- 
tween m X's. This will always happen (and is the basis of all defences of 
free-pricing systems) if the number of our political instruments ex-
ceeds the number of our targets. Detailed policies, in a sense are only 
necessary if there are a large number of targets to be attained that can- 
not be given a general covering formula. In practical matters this will 
often be so again for short-run policies, when all sorts of boundary 
conditions will have to be taken into account as a consequence of rigid- 
ities. As an example the maintenance of high employment may be cited. 
In the long run this is a single target since in the long run workers are 
mobile from one industry to another. In the short run it is a multiple 
target since there is lack of mobility. Only then, and hence temporarily, 
are detailed policies necessary. 
Netherlands School of Economics, Rotterdam 
You have printed the following article:
Four Alternative Policies to Restore Balance of Payments Equilibrium
J. Tinbergen
Econometrica, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Jul., 1952), pp. 372-390.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28195207%2920%3A3%3C372%3AFAPTRB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L
This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an
off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please
visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.
[Footnotes]
1 On Making the Best of Balance of Payments Restrictions on Imports
M. Fleming
The Economic Journal, Vol. 61, No. 241. (Mar., 1951), pp. 48-71.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28195103%2961%3A241%3C48%3AOMTBOB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K
http://www.jstor.org
LINKED CITATIONS
- Page 1 of 1 -
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.
